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Abstract
Should firms that apply machine learning algorithms in their decision–making make
their algorithms transparent to the users they affect? Despite growing calls for algo-
rithmic transparency, most firms have kept their algorithms opaque, citing potential
gaming by users that may negatively affect the algorithm’s predictive power. We
develop an analytical model to compare firm and user surplus with and without al-
gorithmic transparency in the presence of strategic users and present novel insights.
We identify a broad set of conditions under which making the algorithm transparent
benefits the firm. We show that, in some cases, even the predictive power of machine
learning algorithms may increase if the firm makes them transparent. By contrast,
users may not always be better off under algorithmic transparency. The results hold
even when the predictive power of the opaque algorithm comes largely from correla-
tional features and the cost for users to improve on them is close to zero. Overall,
our results show that firms should not view manipulation by users as bad. Rather,
they should use algorithmic transparency as a lever to motivate users to invest in more
desirable features.
Keywords: Algorithmic Transparency, Game Theory, Machine Learning, Strategic
Classification, Signaling Game
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1 Introduction
Machine learning algorithms are being increasingly applied to decision–making processes with
far–reaching impacts extending to employment, access to credit, and education (Schellmann
and Bellini, 2018, Wladawsky-Berger, 2019, Fu et al., 2019). However, firms typically keep
these algorithms as closely guarded secrets, on par with KFC or Coca-Cola’s recipes. As a
result, these algorithms stay opaque to the people who they affect and lack clear explanations
for the decisions they make.
Our study is motivated by the growing calls from different parts of society to require
firms to make their algorithms transparent. According to American privacy law expert
Marc Rotenberg: “At the intersection of law and technology – knowledge of the algorithm
is a fundamental right, a human right.”1 The European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) dictates that, whenever personal data is subject to automated decision
making, people have “the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller”
or the right to an explanation.2
While making algorithms transparent is desirable, it can open the door to gaming and
potentially adversely affect the classification outcome. If strategic agents were to know the
information about the classifier, in other words, how observed attributes affect classification
outcome, they may manipulate their attributes to receive a more desirable classification,
hurting the predictive power of the algorithm. In financial and economic policy making, this
problem is widely known as Goodhart’s Law which proclaims that “when a measure becomes
a target, it ceases to be a good measure” (Goodhart, 1984). A similar notion is captured
in the Lucas critique (Lucas et al., 1976). In fact, Fair Isaac Corporation keeps its exact
credit scoring formula secret to make it more difficult for consumers to game the algorithm
(Citron and Pasquale, 2014). Similarly, Google continues to modify its secret search ranking
algorithm to keep businesses and people from gaming the system (Segal, 2011).
Motivated by the calls for algorithmic transparency and the threat of manipulation by the
agents to transparent algorithms, we investigate how algorithmic transparency may affect
firms and agents. First, from the perspective of the firm (decision–maker) we ask, is there any
advantage in making its algorithm transparent when there is the potential for manipulation
by agents? Second, we ask, if agents receive more information about the factors affecting
algorithmic decisions, would they be better off or worse off if firms make their algorithms
1See “Algorithmic Transparency: End Secret Profiling” https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/
2See “Algorithmic transparency and the right to explanation: Transparency is only the first step”
https://www.apc.org/en/blog/algorithmic-transparency-and-right-explanation-transparency-only-first-step
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transparent? Third, we ask, how are the results affected by the predictive power of those
features that are more susceptible to gaming by agents? Finally, we ask, does the market
composition in terms of desirable and undesirable agents affect these results?
We explicitly model agents as strategic and the algorithm designer (the firm) aware of this
potential for manipulation. Hence, the firm can react to gaming by the agents. For example,
consider that firm collects data, trains an algorithm that maps a set of observed features
to a classification outcome, and publishes a decision rule. If agents desire to be positively
classified, they would manipulate the values of the features to achieve it. However, the firm
would be aware that the behavior of the agents has changed. It will collect new data and
update the model and the decision rule. The agents’ behavior would change once again. Over
time, the firm will iterate to a fixed point – this decision rule would be the best response to
the agents’ strategic behavior.
More specifically, we model a job hiring scenario, where a risk-neutral firm offers a fixed
wage and wants to recruit only highly productive agents. There are two types of agents
– High talent (H ) and Low talent (L). The H type agents are more productive compared
to L type agents. While the type of agent is fixed, this is not observed by the firm ex-
ante. However, the firm has access to a number of observed features, observables, which the
firm uses to map the agent types, using historical data and an algorithm, and determines a
decision rule for hiring the agents.
We model two types of observables, causal and correlational. Typically in machine learn-
ing models, the designer is focused on model accuracy and not on causality. However, any
features that are captured by the machine learning model could still be classified as causal
or correlational. For simplicity, we model only two features, one causal and the other cor-
relational. There are several unique characteristics of these features that are important for
our model. By definition, the causal feature impacts the productivity of the agent, whereas
the correlational feature does not. The agents can game (alter) both features by incurring a
cost. As is typically assumed in most signaling game models (Spence, 1973), H type agents
have a cost advantage on the causal feature. We further assume that the cost of improving
the correlational feature is type independent and close to zero.
The assumptions behind the cost structures of causal and correlational features warrant
some discussion. When an H type agent has a significant cost advantage over an L type agent
regarding the causal feature, it will trivially lead to a separating equilibrium where only H
types get high values on the causal feature. It is, in cases where the cost advantage of H
type agents on the causal feature is not large enough, that a firm would want to include the
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correlational feature in the machine learning model, and hence, in the decision rule. In these
cases, the correlational feature would provide additional value in separating the two agent
types. It is easy to see that the correlational feature is the one that appears to be the most
susceptible to gaming. If agents game it, it will lose its predictive power. This is precisely
the reason typically purported for opposing algorithmic transparency. If the cost to alter
the correlational feature were very high or the H type agent had an advantage over it, either
gaming would not happen or gaming would be more favorable to H type agents. In such a
case, making the algorithm transparent would be either better or at least as good as keeping
it opaque for the firm. Our interest is in investigating whether algorithmic transparency can
be better for the firm as opposed to keeping the algorithm opaque even when the H type
agent has no cost advantage on the correlational feature and this cost is close to zero making
an algorithm highly susceptible to gaming.
We solve for optimal agent and firm behavior in two scenarios, an opaque algorithm
scenario and a transparent algorithm scenario. In both scenarios, we employ the Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept. The Nash equilibrium is the fixed–point solution to the
game between a strategic firm and agents where the firm (agent)’s action is the best response
to the agent(firm)’s action. In equilibrium, neither the firm nor the agents have any incentive
to deviate. We then compare the firm’s payoff under the two scenarios to determine whether
the firm would prefer the transparent or the opaque scenario.
In the opaque scenario, the agents move first. In this scenario, we assume that the agents
are aware of the causal feature but have limited knowledge of the correlational feature.
Consequently, the agents can only game the causal feature. Furthermore, the agents know
that the firm uses a correlational feature. However, they do not know what that feature is.
However, it is common knowledge that the feature has predictive power that can separate
H type agents from L type agents. This assumption is reasonable, as one can see that, if
a feature has no predictive power in separating the two types of agents, a machine learning
algorithm would discard it.
In the transparent scenario, the firm moves first and publishes its algorithm. The agents
observe this algorithm and know what features are included and their respective weights. In
this scenario, the agents can game both the causal and the correlational features. They also
know that the correlational feature is correlated with their type.
While in both the opaque and transparent scenarios, the agents move sequentially, we
do not employ a Stackelberg equilibrium as our solution concept. In the opaque case, given
that there are many uncoordinated agents, the unilateral deviation of a single agent will not
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change the follower (i.e. firm)’s strategy so there might be profitable deviation even if the
system reaches a Stackelberg equilibrium. In the transparent scenario, there is a single first
mover, and it is possible for the firm to commit to the posted algorithm. Consequently, a
Stackelberg equilibrium is a valid solution concept in this scenario. However, a Stackelberg
equilibrium provides an advantage to the first mover, which is the firm in the transparent
scenario. Thus, the firm could prefer a transparent scenario over an opaque scenario simply
due to the first mover advantage it provides. To avoid this possibility, we employ the Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept in both the transparent and opaque scenarios. ‘
Our first result challenges the conventional wisdom that making algorithms transparent
will always hurt the firm (decision maker) economically. We identify a broad set of
conditions under which making the algorithm transparent is beneficial for the
firm. The key intuition behind this result is driven by how H type and L type agents
respond to algorithmic transparency. Because investment into the causal feature is costly and
because H type agents have advantage on the correlational feature, they invest in improving
the causal feature only to the extent that it, along with the correlational feature, helps them
separate themselves from L type agents. When the algorithm is made transparent, the L
type agents game the correlational feature. As a result, L type agents become similar to H
type agents on that feature, and the predictive power of the correlational feature decreases.
Hence, the H type agents have to invest more in the causal feature to separate themselves
from the L type agents. When the H type agents have significant cost advantage over the
L type agents on the causal feature, this leads to full separation, which benefits the firm.
When the cost advantage of the H type agents on the causal feature is marginal, the L type
agents also invest significantly into the causal feature once the disadvantage they faced due
to the correlational feature disappears under transparency. In this case, both the H and
L type agents become more productive because of higher investment in the causal feature.
Even though the firm cannot separate the two types of agents in this case, when the causal
feature’s impact on productivity is above a certain threshold, the average productivity of
the hired agents is significantly higher than in the opaque case. In other words, making the
algorithm transparent allows the firm to motivate the agents to invest in improving features
that are valuable to the firm.
Agents have more information under the transparent scenario. Consequently, one would
think agents would be better off under the transparent scenario. However, our second result
is that the agents are not always better off under the transparent scenario. There
are conditions under which the agents are worse off in the transparent scenario. More
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interestingly, in most cases where the firm prefers the transparent scenario, the agents prefer
the opaque scenario and vice versa. However, we also identified a set of conditions where
both the firm and the agents prefer the transparent scenario. The intuition for this result
is similar to that of the first result. The firm prefers the transparent scenario in situations
where transparency motivates the agents to invest highly in the causal feature. When this
cost of investment is high and the H type agents have significant advantage, only the H type
agents will invest in the causal feature. In this situation, although only the H type agents are
hired, they are worse off because of the high cost that they incurred. When this investment
cost is moderate and the H type agents have a marginal cost advantage over the L type
agents, both agent types invest in the causal feature, and both are hired. The agents are
better off because they have to incur a moderate cost for being hired. Simultaneously, the
firm is better off as the average productivity of the hired agents is higher when the impact
of causal feature on productivity is above a threshold.
As the predictive power of the correlational feature increases, one would expect the firm
to be better off with an opaque algorithm. However, our third result shows it is possible
that the firm prefers algorithmic transparency when the correlational feature has
high predictive power and prefers an opaque algorithm when the correlational
feature has low predicted power. The key intuition behind this result is that, when the
correlational feature is good at separating H type agents from L type agents, the H type
agents have little incentive to invest in the causal feature in the opaque scenario. However,
under transparency, the H type agents lose this advantage and have to invest in the causal
feature to separate themselves from L type agents. As a result, the firm can hire more
productive agents under transparency.
Our fourth result is that, when the fraction of H type agents on the market
is higher, the firm prefers the transparent algorithm under certain conditions.
More specifically, the fraction of H type agents impacts the firm’s surplus but does not have
a large enough impact to alter its decision for or against transparency when the cost for
improving the causal feature is too high or too low or the H type agents have a large cost
advantage over the L type agents. However, when the cost as well as the cost advantage for
the H type agents is moderate, the firm prefers algorithmic transparency as the fraction of
H type agents on the market increases. In this cost range, both the H and L type agents
would improve on the causal feature. While the firm is unable to separate the two and hires
both, the number of L type agents that are hired becomes smaller as the fraction of H type
agents on the market increases.
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Our paper makes several contributions. This paper is one of the first to provide an analyt-
ical model that systematically compares a firm’s decision choice of algorithmic transparency
versus opacity in the presence of strategic agents. We show that, counter to conventional
wisdom, the firm could be better off under algorithmic transparency. By contrast, in most
cases where the firm prefers algorithmic transparency, the agents will be worse off. Agents
underinvest in the causal feature when the algorithm is opaque. Consequently, the firm
depends upon the correlational feature to separate them from one another. Our results and
analysis show that the firm should not worry about the potential loss of predictive power of
the correlational feature of its machine learning model under transparency. Rather, it should
use algorithmic transparency as a lever to motivate the agents to invest more in the causal
feature. The firm would typically be reluctant to adopt algorithmic transparency when their
machine learning model derives large predictive power from the correlational feature. How-
ever, we show that the firm should recognize that investment in the causal feature by agents
is endogenous. Agents are less likely to invest in the causal feature when the correlational
feature is able to separate them. This is the scenario where the firm should be willing to
lose the predictive power of the correlational feature. We have demonstrated our results
in conditions where the firm is certain it will lose the predictive power of the correlational
feature and does not have a first mover advantage under algorithmic transparency or the
difference in the causal feature is insufficient for separating the H type and L type agents
in the opaque machine learning model. Intuitively, one would think that algorithmic trans-
parency would be bad for the firm under these conditions. We have shown that, once one
considers endogenous investment in the causal feature, the competition between the H and
L type agents, and the impact of the causal feature on productivity, the firm would be better
off making the algorithm transparent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss how we build upon and con-
tribute to the literature in Section 2. The main model is presented in Section 3. In Section
4, we present the analysis of the model, and we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Literature
Algorithmic transparency is a relatively new topic, but it is closely related to literature on
information asymmetry. Following the canonical job market signaling model developed by
Spence (1973), a rich stream of research has focused on the interaction between a decision
maker and strategic agents under asymmetric information. Some of this research is focused
on the agent’s side and study how agents strategically reveal their type under various market
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conditions (e.g., the stream of signaling game literature). Other research is focused on the
decision makers’ side, studying how they can design optimal algorithm to extract agents’
private information (e.g., the stream of strategic classification literature). Our work on
algorithmic transparency is built upon and contributes to both these streams of literature.
In both opaque and transparent scenarios, the interaction between the firm and the agents
can be adapted into the signaling game framework, where individuals first send signals, and
the firm then makes hiring decisions based on the observed signals (Spence, 1973, Engers,
1987, Weiss, 1983, Daley and Green, 2014). The signaling game models focus on specifying
the equilibrium outcome under various market conditions. Receivers are assumed to be in a
competitive environment and always receive zero profit in the equilibrium. All the surplus is
extracted by senders. The equilibrium concept typically used in signaling game models is the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), where three conditions are satisfied: senders are using
optimal strategies facing the wage offer, receivers give wage offers such that they will obtain
zero profit, and the receiver’s beliefs about the senders’ type given the signal is consistent
with the truth. Similar to the signaling games, we also specify equilibrium under various
market conditions under the transparent and opaque scenarios. However, in our model, the
firm offers a fixed wage and is focused on designing the algorithm to increase its chances of
hiring the most productive agents, which contrasts with the signaling games where all agents
are hired and the firm’s objective is to decide how much salary to offer to each agent,
On the firm side, our model setup bears more similarity to the strategic classification
problems – offering a fixed wage, the firm decides whether to hire the agents based on the
signal (Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2019, Frankel and Kartik, 2019, Bonatti and Cisternas,
2019). In other words, the firm is trying to classify agents based on whether their expected
productivity exceeds the wage or not. This classification setting makes it possible for us to
analyze the economic impact of algorithmic transparency on the decision maker by comparing
their equilibrium payoff in the opaque and transparent scenarios. Moreover, we do not assume
the signal (education level in our example) to always be pure money burning. Instead, we
allow the causal feature to positively impact productivity and we specify conditions regarding
this positive effect under which a transparent algorithm will benefit the decision maker. In
that aspect, our work is also closely related to the strategic classification literature that
assumes the existence of both causal and non-causal features. In contrast to the strategic
classification literature that usually employs the Stackelberg equilibrium, we use the Nash
equilibrium for both the opaque and transparent scenarios. Several related studies have
adopted the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept (Bru¨ckner et al., 2012, Dalvi et al.,
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2004). More recently, research in both economics and computer science has noted that under
Stackelberg equilibrium, the decision maker can receive a higher payoff compared to Nash
equilibrium, but this may result in heavier social burdens (Frankel and Kartik, 2019, Milli
et al., 2019).
Signaling Games: Signaling game literature studies how agents strategically reveal
their type to a principle in a situation of information asymmetry. Traditional signaling
models typically assume that costly actions are the only channels through which agents can
signal their type (Spence, 1973). In these models, standard assumptions such as the Spence-
Mirrlees single-crossing condition ensure the existence of separating equilibria: equilibria
that fully reveal agents’ private information. While the machine learning models are trying
to solve the same problem (i.e., a decision maker trying to identify the type of agents under
information asymmetry), they differ from the classical signaling models in a number of ways.
A machine learning model uses multiple features through which it tries to learn an agent’s
type. Each feature is essentially an action taken by the agent that signal their type. Some
of these features are costly, while others are not.
Our paper is related to recent signaling papers that have also considered multiple actions
as channels through which an agent can signal their type (Engers, 1987, Frankel and Kartik,
2019, Daley and Green, 2014, Alo´s-Ferrer and Prat, 2012). In these papers, the agent is
always aware of the actions that are used as signals by the decision maker. In contrast, in
our model’s opaque case, the agents know that a correlational feature is being used by the
firm, but they do not know exactly what feature that is.
In our model, agents can use causal and/or correlational features to signal their type. The
causal feature is similar to the costly signal dimension typically captured in the traditional
signaling literature. A key difference is that we allow it to act as a signal of an agent’s
type as well as have an impact on productivity, similar to Weiss (1983). For example, if
agents of the same type have different levels of education, in our model, the firm would
receive different values from them. The correlational feature that we model bears some
similarities to the information in cheap talk games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). This feature
is almost costless to share, and it affects the eventual payoff of both the firm and the agent
where their incentives are not perfectly aligned. In cheap talk games, the agent strategically
manipulates this information, whereas, in our model, the agent does not know about this
feature and cannot manipulate it in the opaque case.
Similar to our model, a few recent papers have modeled the trade-offs that an agent
faces in the presence of multiple signals. Daley and Green (2014) model a scenario where a
8
student can send a costly signal (e.g., joint degree completion) or rely on a type–correlated
noisy signal (e.g., grades) to the recruiter. They characterized the results in terms of the
informativeness of the noisy signal. The noisy signal is similar to the correlated feature
that we model, and its informativeness is also modeled similarly to how we capture the
predictive power of the correlated feature. A key finding of this paper is that, when grades
are informative, H type senders are less eager to send costly signals because they can now rely
on grades, while L type senders are more willing to send signals to de-emphasize the grades
dimension. Consequently, separating equilibrium on the costly signal dimension is harder
to sustain. Our model also shares some similarities with this paper in that we also point
out the possibility that this extra informative dimension will change individuals’ behavior
on the more costly signaling dimension. However, there are key differences in our model’s
assumptions and results. Unlike the grades dimension, where individuals have little chance
to manipulate its value, in our model, the firm can give individuals the opportunity to
game this correlational feature by making the algorithm transparent. On the one hand this
dimension will be less informative. On the other hand, individuals’ behavior on the more
costly signaling dimension will also change and could lead to a separating equilibrium in
many cases.
Strategic Classification: Strategic classification literature considers the problem of
designing optimal classification algorithms when facing strategic users who may manipulate
the input to the system at a cost (Hardt et al., 2016). Canonical strategic classification
models deem that the user’s manipulation always hurts the decision maker. Guided by
this belief, a large stream of research on strategic classification is focused on developing
algorithms that are robust to gaming (Meir et al., 2012, Cummings et al., 2015, Chen et al.,
2018). Recently, several papers have argued that this gaming itself can be beneficial to the
decision maker; thus, instead of focusing on manipulation-proof algorithms, these papers
focus on designing algorithms that incentivize individuals to invest in desirable features
(Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2019, Alon et al., 2020, Haghtalab et al., 2020). These papers
are the ones we want to highlight since our paper also points out the difference between
‘gaming’ and ‘improvement’: gaming is bad for the decision maker because it deteriorates
the information contained in the relevant features, but ‘improvement’ could be beneficial to
the decision maker since it will causally impact the target variable.
Kleinberg and Raghavan (2019) studied the principle-agent problem where the agents’
features (e.g., final exam score) can be improved in two ways: by investing effort in a desirable
way (e.g., spending time on course material) or by investing effort in an undesirable way (e.g.,
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cheating). The effectiveness of each kind of effort on the feature is called the effort profile.
The decision maker can observe their performance on the features but cannot observe in
which way the agents achieve their scores. Alon et al. (2020) used a similar setting but
extended Kleinberg and Raghavan (2019)’s model into a multi-agent scenario. Instead of
assuming every individual shares the same effort profile, they focused on designing optimal
algorithms that can work for a group of individuals who may have different effort profiles.
Our work is different from theirs with respect to one important aspect: while they assume a
feature can be improved in either a causal or non-causal way, our model assumes there are
pure causal features and pure correlational features. Causal features (e.g., education level)
can be improved only in a ‘causal’ way (such that the value of the target variable will also
increase). Correlational features (e.g., whether an applicant wears glasses or not) can be
improved only by gaming. If there was a ‘causal’ way to improve the correlational feature,
then the firm’s willingness to publish the correlational feature might come from the fact that
incentivizing individuals to improve will causally increase their work performance. We have
shown that even in the case where gaming on the pure correlational feature has no positive
effect on productivity, the firm may still want to publish it. Furthermore, none of the papers
above have studied how firms may choose between opaque and transparent algorithms.
Two papers we want to highlight are those of Frankel and Kartik (2019) and Bonatti and
Cisternas (2019). These two economics papers show the decision maker could be ex-ante
better off by committing to some ex-post sub-optimal strategies such as down-weighting
some relevant features. Our paper is relevant with respect to these papers in the sense that
‘publishing the algorithms’ could also be seen as a way to down-weight the correlational fea-
ture. There are critical differences between these papers and ours in terms of mechanisms.
In their papers, ex-post sub-optimal behavior such as ‘under-utilizing’ some informative fea-
tures might be preferred by the decision maker because users may have less incentive to
manipulate these features if they anticipate these decisions. The decision maker loses some
predictive accuracy from features to true labels, but these features now better represent
natural behavior instead of gaming behavior. Consequently, not fully exploiting the infor-
mation contained in relevant features might be optimal ex-ante. Our paper, however, shows
that even if this ‘down-weighting’ behavior has no influence on individuals’ gaming behavior,
there are still some beneficial effects to the decision maker. In our paper, the purpose of
‘down-weighting’ the correlational feature is not to eliminate gaming behavior, but rather to
increase the competitive intensity regarding the causal features for which the H type agents
hold a cost advantage on.
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3 Model
In this section, we discuss a parsimonious model that captures how agents and a firm act
under opaque and transparent algorithms. We consider the hiring scenario discussed above
with two types of agents: high-talent H agents and low-talent L agents. For simplicity, we
normalize the number of agents to 1 and assume that a θ portion of them are type H and
the remaining a 1− θ portion are type L.
Talent level is directly related to job performance and, ideally, the firm would like to
hire only high-talent agents. However, the firm cannot directly observe an agent’s type until
they are hired and work at the firm for a while. Consequently, the firm can only use some
observable agent features to help differentiate between these two types of agents. We broadly
classify the features into two types: causal features and correlational features. For simplicity,
we assume that the firm only uses one causal feature (which is common knowledge to the
firm and the agents, for example, education level) and one correlational feature (which is
unknown to the agents unless the firm decides to reveal it). Each takes on a discrete value of
0 (low) or 1 (high). In other words, each agent can be characterized by one of four possible
combinations (or states) in the feature space:
• State A (low causal, high correlational);
• State B (high causal, high correlational);
• State C (low causal, low correlational); and
• State D (high causal, low correlational).
The firm’s hiring strategy can therefore be represented by four hiring probabilities for the
four states. In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to these probabilities as PA, PB,
PC , and PD, respectively.
We assume that it is costly for agents to make improvement on the common knowledge
causal feature, and that H type agents have a cost advantage on this feature. Specifically,
we assume that CH (the cost of improving the causal feature for H type agents) is less
than CL (the cost for L type agents). In contrast, the cost for making improvement on the
correlational feature is assumed to be the same for H type and L type agents and is very
small (i.e., marginally above zero). It is worth noting that, although the cost of improving
any given correlational feature is small, there are many of them, and agents do not know
which correlational feature will be used in the algorithm unless the firm decides to reveal it.
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To model the situation where the firm has an incentive to include the correlational feature
into its decision making, we further assume that a λ portion of H type agents and a 1 − λ
portion of L type agents have value 1 on the firm’s chosen correlational feature. Moreover, λ ∈
[ 0.5, 1], which, indicates a positive correlation between an agent’s value on the correlational
feature and their type being H.
The game between the firm and the agents is played as follows. In the first stage, the firm
makes a decision on transparency (i.e., opaque or transparent), and this decision is known
to all agents. If the firm chooses “opaque,” the second stage of the game proceeds as follows.
The agents first choose their strategies, and then the firm make its hiring decisions based
upon the observed agent strategies. If, on the other hand, the firm chooses “transparent,”
the second stage of the game proceeds as follows. The firm first announces the correlational
feature used in the algorithm together with its hiring strategy (i.e., the probability of hiring
an agent at a given state), and then the agents make their decisions. Note that, when
choosing the transparent algorithm, the firm reveals both the correlational feature it will
use and its hiring strategy. This assumption is motivated by common practices. When law
makers or the general public ask for “transparency” of a system, they are requesting the
complete knowledge of how that system’s algorithms work, including all their input features,
their objectives, and their inner-workings. Similarly, when researchers propose algorithmic
transparency as a remedy for secret profiling or illegal discrimination, they generally use
“transparency” to refer to a complete revelation of the mechanism of the algorithm (see,
e.g., (Citron and Pasquale, 2014) and (Pasquale, 2015)).
In this paper, in order to focus on the more interesting and realistic cases, we make the
following assumptions regarding the strategy of the agents.
1. In the opaque case, agents will only focus on whether to improve their causal fea-
tures. This assumption is motivated by the fact that, while causal features are usually
common knowledge between the firm and the agents (e.g., education level plays an
important role in hiring decisions), correlational features are less so. In the opaque
case, the firm does not reveal which correlational feature it will use in its algorithm
to the agents. Consequently, the best that an agent can do is make a random guess.
Since there is a large number of potential correlational features and the firm only uses
one of them, from the individual agent’s perspective, it is not beneficial to improve any
of the potential correlational features since the probability of hitting the right one is
slight.
2. In the transparent case, all agents will improve their correlational features. Once the
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firm reveals the correlational feature that it will use in its algorithm, the probability
that an individual agent to hit the right feature becomes 1. Since the cost of improving
the correlational feature is very small, as long as it increases an agent’s probability of
being hired, they will improve this feature. It is worth noting that assuming all agents
will improve the correlational feature used in the algorithm does not cause a loss of
generality. There is no loss of generality because, under the scenario where all agents
achieve a “high” state on the disclosed correlational feature, this feature completely
loses its predictive power and, therefore, will drop out of the prediction algorithm. If
it can be shown that the firm can still benefit from making its algorithm transparent
in such an extreme case of “agent gaming,” it sends a strong message that algorithmic
transparency can indeed be economically beneficial.
3.1 The Firm’s Utility
As previously mentioned, the causal feature (hearafter, we use education level as an example
of a causal feature) has a direct influence on the agent’s performance, while the correla-
tional feature does not. Thus, an agent’s performance is determined by both their type
(T ∈ {H,L}) and their education level (Education ∈ {0, 1}). Here, we are following Weiss
(1983) and allowing education to not only act as a signal of type but also contribute to the
productivity of agents. We assume that the marginal effects of type and education are α and
β, respectively. For convenience, we normalized the performance of an uneducated L type
agent to 0. The mathematical expression of an agent’s performance is thus given by:
W (T,Education) = α× 1(T = H) + β × 1(Education = 1). (1)
In the opaque case, each agent is characterized by their type T ∈ {H,L} and state (at the
end of the game, as defined above) S ∈ {A, B, C, D}. We can write an agent’s performance
as a function of their type and final state as follows:
W TS = α× 1(T = H) + β × (1(S = B) + 1(S = D)). (2)
In the transparent case, since all agents are “high” on the correlational feature, they only
differ on the causal feature (i.e., education). This means we can reduce the number of possible
states from four to two, state E (low education) and state F (high education). Using these
state definitions, we can write an agent’s performance as follows:
W TS = α× 1(T = H) + β × 1(S = F ). (3)
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Once an agent is hired, their performance will contribute to the firm’s payoff, and the firm
will pay them reward R (i.e., job compensation). Let nTS denote the number of agents of type
T whose final states are S, and let nS = n
H
S + n
L
S denote the total number of agents whose
final states are S. Furthermore, let γES denote the proportion of H type agents in state S
at the end (E) of the game. The firm’s total payoff under hiring strategies (or probabilities)
P = (PA, PB, PC , PD), in the opaque case, or P = (PE, PF ), in the transparent case, can be
mathematically expressed as
Πfirm =
∑
S
PS ·
[
nHS (W
H
S −R) + nLS(WLS −R)
]
=
∑
S
PS · nS ·
[
γES (W
H
S −R) + (1− γES )(WLS −R)
]
. (4)
3.2 The Agents’ Utility
In the opaque case, agents do not know which correlational feature will be used by the firm’s
algorithm, and therefore, they will only focus on whether to improve on the causal feature
(i.e., education). Agents of the same type use the same strategy. Let uT denote the utility
of a T type agent, and we have
uH =
λPBR + (1− λ)PDR− CH if H type improves on the causal feature,λPAR + (1− λ)PCR otherwise; (5)
uL =
(1− λ)PBR + λPDR− CL if L type improves on the causal feature,(1− λ)PAR + λPCR otherwise. (6)
In the transparent case, all agents will have a “high” value on the correlational feature,
and their decision is whether to improve on the causal feature or not. The utility of a T
type agent in the transparent case is:
uH =
PFR− CH if H type improves on the causal feature,PER otherwise; (7)
uL =
PFR− CL if L type improves on the causal feature,PER otherwise. (8)
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3.3 Additional Parametric Assumptions
In Section 4, we will solve the game using backward induction. For each combination of
(CH , CL), we will derive the payoff for the firm in both the opaque and transparent cases.
We will then specify the range of values of the parameters where the firm is better or worse
off when choosing to be transparent instead of opaque. We will show most of our results in
the CH-CL space (see Figure 1). Since we assume that H type agents have a cost advantage
on improving the causal feature (CH < CL), the region above the diagonal line in Figure 1
is infeasible.
Figure 1: The CH-CL space
We further make the following three assumptions regarding the relationships among dif-
ferent parameters to allow us to focus on non-trivial and more interesting cases.
Assumption 1
0 < β < R < α.
Assumption 1 says that the performance of an individual H type agent always exceeds
the salary R regardless of their education level, whereas the performance of an individual L
type agent is always smaller than salary R. This condition ensures that the firm only wants
to hire H type agents.
The assumption that β < α implies that an H type agent with a low level of education
is still more productive than an L type agent with a high level of education. Furthermore,
β < R ensures that improving education alone does not guarantee an agent will be hired. If
β ≥ R, then the firm will hire anyone with a high level of education, resulting in a trivial
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equilibrium where everyone receives high education and the firm hires everyone. α > R
ensures that the firm will hire an H type agent irrespective of their education level. If
α ≤ R, then the firm will once more have no incentive to hire agents without education since
their productivity is lower than the salary, leading to an uninteresting equilibrium where
everyone receives education.
Assumption 2
(θλ+ (1− θ)(1− λ))R
θλ
< α <
R
θ
.
Recall that α denotes the productivity advantage that H type agents hold over L type
agents. This assumption ensures that α falls in a certain range and does not lead to trivial
equilibria. The derivations of the lower bound and the upper bound of α can be found in
Appendix A.3. Intuitively, if α is too small, the firm will not have enough incentive to hire
anyone even if a large portion of agents are of type H. If alpha is too large, the firm will hire
everyone even if only a small portion of them are of type H. We refer to the lower (upper)
bound of α as α(α¯) hereafter.
Assumption 3
R− θα < β < R− θ(1− λ)α
θ(1− λ) + (1− θ)λ.
Assumption 3 says that the marginal effect of education on productivity (β) is in a certain
range. This assumption also helps us focus on only non-trivial scenarios. The derivations and
interpretations of the lower and upper bound of β can be found in Appendix A.3. Intuitively,
if β is too small, the firm will have little incentive to hire agents with high levels of education.
If β is too large, then the firm will hire everyone with high levels of education in both the
opaque and transparent cases. We refer to the lower (upper) bound of β as β(β¯) hereafter.
4 Analysis
Let γBS denote the proportion of H type agents in state S at the beginning (B) of the game.
Per our discussions in Section 3, a θ portion of agents are of H type and the remaining 1− θ
portion are of L type. Moreover, a λ portion of H type agents and a 1−λ portion of L type
agents have the value 1 for the firm’s chosen correlational feature. Therefore,
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γBA =
λθ
λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ) ; (9)
γBC =
(1− λ)θ
(1− λ)θ + λ(1− θ) ; (10)
γBB = γ
B
D = 0. (11)
As discussed earlier, for both the opaque and transparent scenarios, we employ the Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept. This concept allows us to demonstrate the results in
situations where the firm or the agents do not have commitment power or coordination ability
as the first mover. Also, in this case, the Nash equilibrium is a more restrictive equilibrium
concept than the Stackelberg equilibrium when comparing firm payoffs between the opaque
and transparent scenarios. The Stackelberg equilibrium would provide the firm a first mover
advantage in the transparent case whereas the Nash equilibrium would not.
4.1 Opaque Scenario
Per our discussions in Section 3, in the opaque scenario, agents move first and will only decide
on whether to improve on the causal feature (i.e., education). We consider equilibrium
outcomes where all H type agents use the same strategy and all L type agents also use
the same strategy (see below for discussions on different equilibrium outcomes). Given the
agents’ strategy, based on Equation 4, the firm will be indifferent between hiring and not
hiring agents with a final state S if γES (W
H
S −R) + (1− γES )(WLS −R) = 0, or equivalently,
γES =
R−WLS
WHS −WLS
. (12)
By Equation 2, the above fraction equals R
α
when S ∈ {A,C} and R−β
α
when S ∈ {B,D}. Let
γth0 =
R
α
and γth1 =
R−β
α
(by Assumption 1, we have 0 < γth1 < γth0 < 1). Quantities γth0
and γth1 are important in the analysis, especially in determining whether a certain outcome
(i.e., a joint strategy of the agents and the firm) can be sustained in the equilibrium.
There are a total of nine different outcomes for agents’ strategies. The equilibrium can
be sustained with the first five but not the last four. The first five cases are: case 1 (neither
H type nor L type agents improve on education); case 2 (only H type agents improve on
education); case 3 (both H type and L type agents improve on education); case 4 (H type
agents improve on education with some probability, and L type agents do not improve on
education); and case 5 (H type agents improve on education, and L type agents improve on
education with some probability).
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Aside from these five cases, there are four other cases: case 6 (only L type agents improve
on education; case 7 (L type agents improve on education with some probability but H type
agents do not improve on education); case 8 (L type agents improve on education, but H
type agents improve on education only with some probability); and case 9 (both H type and
L type agents improve on education with some probability). However, it is not difficult to
see that cases 6 through 9 cannot be sustained in the equilibrium. For cases 6 through 8,
L type agents have a higher value on education than H type agents, and the firm will have
an incentive to set higher hiring probabilities in states A and C rather than in states B and
D. However, under this hiring strategy, L type agents will have no incentive to improve on
education in the first place. As for case 9, the fact that both H type and L type agents
are using mixed strategies indicates that they are both indifferent between receiving higher
education. Since the cost of receiving higher education for L type agents is greater than it
is for H type agents, to compensate for this higher cost L type agents must have a higher
chance of being hired by the firm than H type agents in the equilibrium. However, the
firm has no incentive to use such hiring strategy. We conclude that although there are nine
possible outcomes for the agents’ strategy, only five of them (cases 1 through 5) can be
equilibrium outcomes.
Out of the above five feasible cases, the actual equilibrium strategy of the agents depends
on the values of (CH , CL). The following lemma summarizes the agents’ equilibrium strategy
for different values of (CH , CL) and the corresponding total payoff for the firm under each
equilibrium case.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium outcome depends on the values of (CH , CL), and this dependence
is shown in Figure 2. The corresponding total payoffs for the firm are given by
ΠfirmO1 = λθα− (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R
ΠfirmO2 = θ(α + β)− θR
ΠfirmO3 = λθ(α + β) + (1− λ)(1− θ)β − (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R
ΠfirmO4 = θ(α + β −R)
(
1− R(1− θ)(1− λ)
(α−R)θλ
)
ΠfirmO5 =
2λ− 1
λ
θ(α + β −R),
where ΠfirmOi denotes the firm’s total payoff in case i.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.1. In proving Lemma 1, we first identify the region
in the CH-CL space in which the strategy of the agents in each of the cases explained above
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Figure 2: Equilibrium outcome in the opaque scenario
can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. It turns out that some of these regions overlap (i.e.,
for a given combination of (CH , CL) in the region, there are multiple Nash Equilibria). Since
the agents move first in the opaque scenario, they can choose the strategy that gives the
highest utility at the end of the game. We focus on the equilibrium outcome that maximizes
the utilities for both agent types (i.e., payoff dominant, neither H type or L type agents have
an incentive to deviate from this strategy).
4.2 Transparent Scenario
In the transparent scenario, the firm moves first by announcing both the correlational feature
that it wants to use and the probability of hiring for each state (i.e., PE and PF ). Per our
discussions in Section 3, all agents will improve on this correlational feature and then decide
whether to improve on the causal feature (i.e., education). Similar to the opaque scenario,
there is a total of nine possible outcomes for the agents’ strategy (we use the same numbering
of the nine cases as in the opaque scenario). To determine whether a certain market-level
outcome (i.e., a joint strategy of the agents and the firm) can be sustained as a Nash
equilibrium, we use the fact that the firm is indifferent between hiring and not hiring agents
with final state S iff γES =
R−WLS
WHS −WLS
. The fraction on the right side of the equality equals γth0
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when S = E and γth1 when S = F .
BAs with the opaque scenario, cases 6 through 9 cannot be sustained in an equilibrium.
Similarly, according to Assumption 3, if everyone is at state F, the firm will hire all agents.
Under case 5, some L type agents are actually at state E, which gives the firm even more
incentive to hire agents in state F. However, again, to be a sustainable equilibrium, the mixed
strategy outcome in case 5 requires the firm to be indifferent between hiring and not hiring
agents from state F. Therefore, neither case 4 nor case 5 can be sustained in an equilibrium in
the transparent scenario. Altogether, this leaves us with only the first three cases as possible
equilibrium outcomes. The following lemma summarizes the agents’ equilibrium strategy for
different values of (CH , CL), as well as the corresponding total payoff for the firm under each
equilibrium. The proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium outcome depends on the values of (CH , CL), and this dependence
is shown in Figure 3. The corresponding total payoffs for the firm are given by
ΠfirmT1 = 0
ΠfirmT2 = θ(α + β −R)
ΠfirmT3 = θ(α + β) + (1− θ)β −R,
where ΠfirmTi denotes the firm’s total payoff in case i.
4.3 The Firm’s Decision on Algorithmic Transparency
The firm can make a decision on algorithmic transparency by comparing the payoffs in the
transparent and opaque scenarios. In this subsection, we will show how the firm is not always
worse off when choosing to be transparent. We divide the blue region in Figures 2 and 3 into
seven smaller regions: N1, N2, and N3 and C1, C2, C3, and C4, respectively (see Figure
4).
We first consider regions N1 through N3. Note that, in these regions, agents apply
the same strategy on the causal feature in both the opaque and transparent scenarios. For
example, region N1 corresponds to case 1 in both the opaque and transparent scenarios,
where no agents improve on education. We now discuss the payoff comparison in these
regions:
• In region N1, agents play the strategy in case 1 in both the opaque and transparent
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Figure 3: Equilibrium outcome in the transparent scenario
Figure 4: The comparison of agents’ behavior in the transparent and opaque scenarios
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scenarios.3 Mathematically, ΠfirmO1 > ΠfirmT1 = 0. Therefore, the firm will always
prefer to be opaque in this region.
• In region N2, agents play the strategy in case 2 in both the opaque and transparent
scenarios. Since ΠfirmO2 = ΠfirmT2 , in this region, the firm is indifferent between being
opaque or transparent.
• In region N3, agents play the strategy in case 3 in both the opaque and transparent
scenarios. We can rewrite ΠfirmT3 as follows:
ΠfirmT3 = θ(α + β)(λ+ (1− λ)) + (1− θ)β(λ+ (1− λ))
−R(θλ+ (1− θ)(1− λ) + (1− θ)λ+ (1− λ)θ).
Since ΠfirmO3 = λθ(α + β) + (1− λ)(1− θ)β − (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R, we have:
ΠfirmT3 − ΠfirmO3 = (1− λ)θ(α + β −R)− λ(1− θ)(R− β)
= θ(1− λ)α− (θ(1− λ) + (1− θ)λ)(R− β) < 0,
where the inequality follows Assumption 3. This means that the firm will always prefer
to be opaque in this region.
We conclude that, in regions N1 through N3, being transparent is never strictly better
than being opaque. This is quite intuitive since, in these regions, agents play the same
strategy on the causal feature in both the opaque and transparent scenarios. Hence, the
firm could only be worse off when revealing its algorithm due to correlational feature’s loss
of predictive power. Specifically, in regions N1 and N3, even when the firm chooses to
be opaque, the predictive power of the algorithm only comes from the correlational feature
because H type agents and L type agents play the same strategy on the causal feature. This
suggests that the firm will incur a significant loss due to the reduction in the algorithm’s
prediction accuracy when the algorithm is made transparent.
We now discuss the payoff comparison in regions C1 through C4. It turns out that, in
each of these regions, it is possible for the firm to be strictly better off by being transparent
instead of being opaque or, in other words, when the value of β (the marginal effect of
education on an agent’s performance) is sufficiently large. In what follows, we first provide
a summary of the payoff comparison result in each region, and then discuss the intuition.
3It is worth mentioning that although agents’ strategies on the causal feature are the same in the opaque
and transparent scenarios, the firm’s payoff is different because of the existence of the correlational feature.
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• In region C1, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 1 to
transparent case 3. ΠfirmT3 > ΠfirmO1 iff
β > β1 = λθ(α−R)− (1− λ)(1− θ)R +R− θα. (13)
Thus, in this region, the firm will prefer to be transparent when β > β1.
• In region C2, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 4 to
transparent case 3. ΠfirmT3 > ΠfirmO4 iff
β > β2 = R− αR(1− λ)
(α−R)λ+R(1− λ) . (14)
Thus, in this region, the firm will prefer to be transparent when β > β2.
• In region C3, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 5 to
transparent case 3. ΠfirmT3 > ΠfirmO5 iff
β > β3 =
λθα− θα− 2λθR + θR + λR
λ− 2θλ+ θ . (15)
In this region, the firm will prefer to be transparent when β > β3. It is interesting to
note, however, that β3 equals β¯ defined in Assumption 3 (see below for an explanation
of why this is the case). Since the value of β cannot exceed β¯ (according to Assumption
3), this means that the firm will never prefer to be transparent in this region.
• In region C4, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 1 to
transparent case 2. ΠfirmT2 > ΠfirmO1 regardless of β. Thus, in this region, the firm
will always prefer to be transparent.
According to Assumption 2, the value of α falls in the following interval:
(θλ+ (1− θ)(1− λ))R
θλ
< α <
R
θ
.
Within the above interval, β1 and β3 are decreasing in α, and β2 is increasing in α. Moreover,
β1 = β2 when α = α and β2 = β3 when α = α¯ (α and α¯ are defined in Assumption 2). Thus,
we have β1 < β2 < β3. To understand why we have increasing thresholds for β as we move
from regions C1 to C3 and why there is no threshold for β in region C4, we must look at
how the firm’s decision to be transparent changes the agents’ strategies in different regions.
To facilitate our discussions, we first define the concept of “degree of separation.” Suppose
that there are nH0 H type agents and nL0 L type agents who do not improve on education
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and nH1 H type agent and nL1 L type agents who improve on education. We define the
degree of separation (Dos) between H type and L type agents as follows:
Dos = 1− min(nH0, nL0) + min(nH1, nL1)
nH0 + nL0 + nH1 + nL1
.
Note that, if all agents improve on education or no one improves on education, then Dos
reaches its minimum value: Dosmin = max(θ, 1 − θ). If all H type agents improve on
education and no L type agents improve on education, then Dos reaches its maximum value:
Dosmax = 1. If either H type or L type agents use a mixed strategy, the value of Dos is
somewhere in between. The key observation here is that, the higher the value of Dos, the
easier it is for the firm to differentiate H type agents from L type agents using the causal
feature.
We now discuss how the firm’s decision to be transparent changes agents’ strategies in
regions C1 through C4. Note that transparency intensifies agents’ competition on the causal
feature and that this intensified competition has the following two effects.
1. The degree of separation between H type and L type agents on their causal feature
changes. As an illustration, consider region C4. In this region, when the firm switches
from being opaque to being transparent, agents’ strategies also switch from opaque
case 1 to transparent case 2. Under opaque case 1, neither H type nor L type agents
improve on education, whereas under transparent case 2, only H type agents improve
on education. This means that H type agents are now more separated from L type
agents on the causal feature (i.e., there is a higher degree of separation). Similarly, it
can also be verified that, in regions C2 and C3, agents become less separated and, in
region C1, there is no change in the degree of separation.
2. Agents’ average value on the causal feature becomes higher and their work performance
increases (according to Equation 2). To see this, consider region C1. In this region,
when the firm switches from being opaque to being transparent, agents’ strategies also
switch from opaque case 1 to transparent case 3. Although the change in agents’ strate-
gies does not affect the degree of separation, since both types of agents improve on
education, the average level of education for both agent types increases. Similarly, in
region C2, the average level of education and, thus, the performance level of both types
of agents increase. In region C3, only the average performance of L type agents in-
creases, whereas in region C4, only the average performance of H type agents increases.
We can see that, in regions C1 through C4, the overall average agents’ performance
always increases when the firm switches from being opaque to being transparent.
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Since the firm always loses useful information from the correlational feature that helps it
differentiate between the two types of agents when switching from the opaque to the trans-
parent algorithm, the firm’s decision on algorithmic transparency will depend on whether the
above two effects (i.e., the change in the degree of separation and the increase in the agents’
average performance) can offset the negative effect of information lost on the correlational
feature. In region C1, even though the degree of separation does not change, both H type
and L type agents improve on education, and the firm can benefit from the increase in the
average agents’ performance. Whether this benefit offsets the negative effect of information
loss on the correlational feature depends on the value of β. If β is large enough (i.e., β > β1),
then being transparent is preferred over being opaque. In region C2, the degree of separation
decreases as the agents’ distribution changes from partial separation to pooling. However,
the average performance of H type and L type agents increases, which suggests that, if β is
large enough, the firm can still be better off being transparent. The conditions on β in this
case is stricter than in region C1 (i.e., β > β2 > β1). This is because the marginal effect of
education must now be large enough to offset not only the previously mentioned negative
effect of the loss of information on the correlational feature, but also the worse degree of
separation on the causal feature.
In region C3, the firm’s decision to be transparent affects fewer agents compared to in
region C2. Switching from opaque to transparent incentivizes all L type agents and some H
type agents in region C2 to improve on education but only incentivizes some L type agents
to improve on education in region C3. Since fewer agents are affected by the firm’s switching
from opaque to transparent in region C3 compared with region C2 and since the increase
in the agents’ average performance is proportional to the number of agents being affected,
a larger β is needed in region 3 to achieve the same level of average performance found in
region C2. This is why β3 > β2.
To see why β3 = β¯ (as defined in Assumption 3), note that all H type agents have already
improved on education in the opaque case, and, only some L type agents will switch from not
improving to improving on education when the algorithm is made transparent. According to
Assumption 1, the individual productivity of L type agents cannot exceed R, which means
that the firm will not benefit from hiring extra L type agents even if their education levels
are high. In fact, the portion of L type agents who improve on education also depends on
β (see Equation A.4 in the Appendix). When the value of β is close to β¯, nearly all L
type agents have already chosen to improve on education in the opaque case. Therefore,
switching from opaque to transparent makes a small difference in terms of agents’ average
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performance. However, the firm will be indifferent between being opaque and transparent
only when β reaches β¯. This is why β3 equals β¯.
In region C4, the degree of separation increases when the firm switches from being opaque
to being transparent. In fact, the agents’ distribution changes from pooling to perfect sepa-
ration. This effect in itself is sufficient to offset the negative effect of information lost on the
correlational feature. This is the reason why, in this region, the firm prefers to be transparent
regardless of the value of β.
The following theorem summarizes our findings about the firm’s decision on transparency:
Theorem 1 In regions N1 through N3, being transparent is never strictly better than being
opaque. In regions C1 through C4, depending on the value of β, the firm may prefer being
transparent to being opaque. Specifically, in region C1, the firm will prefer to be transparent
if β > β1; in region C2, the firm will prefer to be transparent if β > β2; in region C3, the firm
will never prefer to be transparent; and, in region C4, the firm will prefer to be transparent
regardless of the value of β.
4.4 The Effect of the Predictive Power of the Correlational Fea-
ture (λ) and the Fraction of High–Talent Agents (θ)
We have shown that the firm will be strictly better off by making the algorithm transparent
if the (CH , CL) pair lands in region C4 or in regions C1 or C2 with some additional condi-
tions on β. In region C4, the transparent algorithm is preferred regardless of β, λ, and θ
since removing the correlational feature changes agents’ behavior on the causal feature from
pooling to full separation and full separation is the case in which the firm receives maximum
profit. In regions C1 and C2, the main driving force that makes the transparent algorithm
preferable is the agents’ increased average performance on the causal feature. As long as
β exceeds the threshold β1(β2), the increased performance on the causal feature will have
a large enough positive effect on work performance to make the firm better off. We now
examine how the thresholds on β changes when λ or θ changes. In other words, we are going
to look at when the correlational feature is more informative (a larger λ) or when there is
a larger portion of H type agents in the population (a larger θ), will the condition on β to
make the transparent algorithm be preferred becomes stricter or milder.
Take the expressions of β1 and β2 in Equations 13 and 14, and take derivatives with
respect to λ.
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∂β1
∂λ
= −2θR + θα +R. (16)
∂β2
∂λ
=
αR(α−R)
(2λR−R− αλ)2 . (17)
Both of these derivatives are greater than 0 in the parameter ranges we are considering.
This means that, within each region, as λ becomes larger, a higher value of β is needed to
make the transparent algorithm preferable. This is because a larger λ value entails more
information is contained in the correlational feature, so a higher causal effect is required
to offset the loss of information from the correlational feature. However, the effect of λ on
algorithmic transparency is not this straightforward since, apart from the equilibrium payoff,
λ can also determine what kind of equilibrium can be sustained given a (CH ,CL) pair (i.e.,
the regions’ shapes in Figure 4 will change as λ changes). Consider the region just beneath
the dividing line of regions N2 and C4: as λ increases, it changes from belonging to region
N2 to belonging to C4. This means the firm will prefer the opaque algorithm when facing a
small λ but prefer a transparent algorithm when faced with a large λ. Although it appears
counterintuitive, it can be explained as follows. When λ is small, making the algorithm
transparent is not effective enough to change agents’ behavior on the causal feature. However,
when λ is large, agents’ behavior on the causal feature will change drastically, and the firm
is able to hire agents who are on average more productive under the transparent scenario
than the opaque scenario.
The following proposition summarizes our findings about how λ affects the firm’s decision
on transparency:
Proposition 1 An increase in λ has the following effects on the firm’s decision on trans-
parency:
1. The area of regions C1, C2, and C4 increases, which means a transparent algorithm
is preferred under more (CH ,CL) value pairs.
2. Within regions C1 and C2, the conditions on β to make a transparent algorithm more
preferred become stricter.
Take the expressions of β1 and β2 in Equations 13 and 14, and take the derivative with
respect to θ.
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∂β1
∂θ
= −2λR + λα +R− α. (18)
∂β2
∂θ
= 0. (19)
It can be shown that ∂β1
∂θ
is smaller than 0 in the parameter ranges we are considering.
This means that, in region C1, as the proportion of H type agents increases, the conditions
on β to make algorithmic transparency more preferred become milder. This is because the
degree of separation on the causal feature in region C1 does not change (from pooling at
0 to pooling at 1). The only negative effect of algorithmic transparency is the loss of the
correlational feature. When θ is high, losing the correlational feature is less harmful for the
firm (less L type agents are mistakenly hired when the correlational feature is lost). Thus, a
smaller β is needed to offset this negative effect. In region C2, however, θ has no influence on
the firm’s decision on algorithmic transparency. This is because in region C2, there are two
negative effects of algorithmic transparency, the loss of the correlational feature and a smaller
degree of separation on the causal feature. A higher θ will mitigate the first effect (similar
reason as before) and amplify the second (more H type agents will be left out). Overall, θ
does not affect the value of β needed for making the transparent algorithm preferable.
The following proposition summarizes our findings about how θ affects the firm’s decision
on transparency:
Proposition 2 In region C1, a higher θ will increase the firm’s incentive to make the algo-
rithm transparent. In other regions, θ has no impact on the firm’s decision on algorithmic
transparency.
4.5 Agents’ Welfare
In Subsections 4.3 and 4.4, we have specified conditions under which a transparent algo-
rithm will yield a strictly higher payoff to the firm. We will next investigate the impact of
algorithmic transparency on the agents’ welfare.
The agents’ payoff in the equilibrium is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For each equilibrium outcome shown in Figure 2 (for the opaque scenario) and
Figure 3 (for the transparent scenario), the corresponding total payoffs for agents are given
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by
ΠagentsO1 = (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R
ΠagentsO2 = θ(R− CH)
ΠagentsO3 = (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R− CHθ − CL(1− θ)
ΠagentsO4 =
(λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))(R− CH)
λ
ΠagentsO5 =
(2Rλ−R− CHλ− CLλ+ CL)θ
λ
ΠagentsT1 = 0
ΠagentsT2 = θ(R− CH)
ΠagentsT3 = R− CHθ − CL(1− θ),
where ΠagentsOi denotes the agents’ total payoff in case i of the opaque scenario and ΠagentsTi
denotes the agents’ total payoff in case i of the transparent scenario.
As previously discussed, Figure 4 shows how agents’ behavior changes on the causal
feature when the algorithm is made transparent. First, consider the three regions where
the agents’ behavior on the causal feature does not change (regions N1, N2, and N3). In
directly comparing the agents’ payoff in the equilibrium, we have the following.
• In region N1, agents play the strategies in case 1 in both the opaque and transparent
scenarios. ΠagentsO1 > ΠagentsT1 . Therefore, agents will receive a higher payoff under
opaque algorithm in this region.
• In region N2, agents play the strategies in case 2 in both the opaque and transparent
scenarios. Since ΠagentsO2 = ΠagentsT2 , in this region, agents are indifferent to whether
the algorithm is opaque or transparent.
• In region N3, agents play the strategies in case 3 in both the opaque and transparent
scenarios. ΠagentsO3 < ΠagentsT3 . Therefore, agents will receive a higher payoff under
transparent algorithm in this region.
In regions N1, N2, and N3, agents’ behavior on the causal feature does not change. Since
improving on the correlational feature is assumed to be costless, agents’ total cost stays the
same as the algorithm becomes transparent. The only thing that varies is the benefit they
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can obtain under the firm’s strategy. In region N1, more agents will be hired under opaque
algorithm (a λ portion of H type agents and a 1−λ portion of L type agents are hired under
the opaque algorithm but no one will be hired under the transparent algorithm). In region
N3, more agents will be hired under the transparent algorithm (a λ portion of H type agents
and a 1−λ portion of L type agents are hired under the opaque algorithm and everyone will
be hired under the transparent algorithm). In region N2, the same number of agents will be
hired regardless of whether the algorithm is opaque or transparent (only H type agents will
be hired).
Furthermore, consider the four regions where agents’ behavior on the causal feature
changes (regions C1, C2, C3, and C4). By directly comparing the agents’ payoffs in the
equilibrium, we obtain the following.
• In region C1, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 1 to
transparent case 3. ΠagentsT3 ≤ ΠagentsO1 iff
CHθ + CL(1− θ) ≥ (1− λθ − (1− λ)(1− θ))R. (20)
The smallest possible value for LHS is reached when a (CH ,CL) pair lands at the lower
left corner in region C1, in other words, when CH = (1 − λ)R and CL = λR. It
can further be shown that this smallest value equals the RHS. Thus, Equation 20 is
satisfied for any (CH ,CL) value in region C1. In this region, the transparent algorithm
will give agents a lower payoff compared with the opaque algorithm.
• In region C2, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 4 to
transparent case 3. ΠagentsT3 ≥ ΠagentsO4 iff
1− λ
λ
CH − CL ≥ ( 1
λ
− 2)R. (21)
The smallest possible value for LHS is reached when a (CH ,CL) pair lands at the lower
right corner in region C2, in other words, when CH = (1 − λ)R and CL = λR. It
can further be shown that this smallest value equals the RHS. Thus, Equation 21 is
satisfied for any (CH ,CL) value in region C2. In this region, the transparent algorithm
will give agents a higher payoff compared with the opaque algorithm.
• In region C3, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 5 to
transparent case 3. ΠagentsT3 ≥ ΠagentsO5 iff
(2θ − θ
λ
− 1)CL ≥ (2θ − θ
λ
− 1)R. (22)
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Since 2θ − θ
λ
− 1 ≤ 0, and CL ≤ R in region C3, Equation 21 is satisfied for any
(CH ,CL) value in region C3. In this region, the transparent algorithm will give agents
a higher payoff compared with the opaque algorithm.
• In region C4, agents’ strategies and the firm’s payoff change from opaque case 1 to
transparent case 2. ΠagentsT2 ≤ ΠagentsO1 iff
θ(R− CH) ≤ (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R. (23)
The largest possible value for LHS is reached when a (CH ,CL) pair lands at the lower
bound of region C4, in other words, when CH = (1 − λ)R. It can be shown that this
largest value is smaller than the RHS. Thus, Equation 23 is satisfied for any (CH ,CL)
value in region C4. In this region, the transparent algorithm will give agents a lower
payoff compared with the opaque algorithm.
The following theorem summarizes our findings regarding the agents’ welfare under
opaque and transparent algorithms.
Theorem 2 Whether the agents are better off under opaque or transparent algorithm de-
pends on the values of (CH ,CL), and this dependence is shown in Figure 5. In regions N3,
C2 and C3, agents’ welfare is higher under transparent algorithm. In region N1, C1 and
C4, agents’ welfare is higher under opaque algorithm. In region N2, agents’ welfare is not
affected by algorithmic transparency.
The intuition behind Theorem 2 can be explained as follows. All agents will prefer an
opaque algorithm when CH and CL are large. They will prefer a transparent algorithm when
CH and CL are small, and will be indifferent when CL is large but CH is small. Making the
algorithm transparent may force agents to invest in the causal feature, but they can also
attain a certain benefit at the same time (higher chance of being hired). The cost of this
investment increases as CH and CL increase, but the benefit does not vary with CH and CL.
Consequently, agents will be worse (better) off under transparent algorithm if CH and CL
are large (small).
Comparing Theorem 1 with Theorem 2, we find that the firm and agents’ interests conflict
in some regions. For example, in regions N3 and C3, a transparent algorithm will give agents
a higher payoff, but the firm prefers an opaque algorithm. In region C4, an opaque algorithm
will give agents a higher payoff but the firm prefers a transparent algorithm. In regions C1
and C2, whether their interests conflict depends on the value of β.
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Figure 5: The comparison of agents’ welfare in transparent and opaque scenarios
In region C2, if condition β > β2 is satisfied, both the firm and agents would prefer
a transparent algorithm over an opaque algorithm. In other words, making the algorithm
transparent will Pareto dominate keeping the algorithm opaque.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Results
In this paper, we studied how firm and agent welfare is affected by algorithmic transparency.
We allowed the agents to be strategic such that they can invest in their causal and correla-
tional features to increase their chances of being hired in response to a firm’s algorithm. We
also investigated how the predictive power of the correlational feature, the market composi-
tion in terms of the fraction of H type agents, and the impact of the causal feature on agent
productivity affect the firm’s decision to make their algorithm transparent or opaque.
As a first result, we identified a broad set of conditions under which the firm would be
better off with algorithmic transparency rather than opacity. There are two scenarios where
a firm would prefer algorithmic transparency. The first is when the H type agents have a
significant cost advantage on causal feature. The second is when the H type agents have
only a moderate cost advantage on the causal feature, the cost itself is moderate and the
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causal feature has a significant impact on the agents’ productivity. The key intuition behind
these conditions is that disclosing the correlational feature will intensify agents’ competition
on the causal feature, which may either help the firm separate different types of agents more
easily or increase agents’ average work performance (or both). This finding is important
because concerns about agents “gaming the system” have been the main reason why firms
are reluctant to make their algorithms transparent despite increasing calls for algorithmic
transparency.
Our second result is that the agents may not always be better off under algorithmic
transparency. We found that, when the firm prefers algorithmic transparency, the agents
prefer opacity and vice versa. Only when specific conditions related to the cost of the causal
feature (scenario 2 above) are satisfied will the firm and agents both prefer algorithmic
transparency.
Our third result is that, when the correlational feature has high predictive power in the
opaque scenario, the firm could be better off making the algorithm transparent. When the
predictive power of the correlational feature is nullified due to gaming under algorithmic
transparency, the only way agents can signal their type is by investing in the costly causal
feature which makes the firm better off.
Our final result is that, when the fraction of H type agents on the market is high, the
firm would be better off by making its algorithm transparent. Even when the causal feature
is unable to separate the two types of agents, the firm is at a much lower risk of hiring an L
type agent if they are only a few of them on the market.
5.2 Implications for Managers
Our paper shows that managers using machine learning models for decision making could
be better off by making their algorithms transparent. Algorithmic transparency does not
always mean a loss of predictive power. In some cases, it can in fact lead to greater predictive
power. In other cases, while it may reduce predictive power, it may still make them better
off by improving the desirability of the whole market. Our results are particularly promising
for managers, as they are now facing growing calls to make their algorithms transparent.
We identified a set of conditions where managers should prefer algorithmic transparency.
There are three factors that managers should consider: (a) access to a good causal feature;
(b) the predictive power of the correlational features; (c) the market composition in terms
of the fraction of H type agents.
We provide some guidance on what make a good causal feature here. The causal feature
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serves two purposes: (a) a signaling purpose – H type agents have a cost advantage on this
feature, and thus, it can help separate H type agents from L type agents; and (b) a human
capital purpose - the feature itself contributes to the productivity of the agents. To serve
the signaling purpose well, the identified causal feature should be neither too costly nor too
cheap to improve. If it is too costly, no one will improve on it. By contrast, if it is too cheap,
everyone will improve on it. Furthermore, in terms of the human capital purpose, the higher
the feature’s impact on productivity, the better it is. Even when this causal feature is unable
to completely separate the H type agents from L type agents, if it is moderately costly and
contributes to productivity, the firm could still be better off. Typically algorithm designers
are not focused on causality or identifying causal features. Our results indicate that they
should. The recent stream of research in computer science that is focused on causal inference
in machine learning models bodes well for them in this regard (Pearl et al., 2000).
The second factor that managers should consider is the predictive power of the correlated
features. Intuitively, managers may think of keeping their algorithms opaque when the cor-
relational features provide significant predictive power. Our results show that this thinking
is incorrect. We show that firms are more likely to be better off by making their algorithms
transparent when correlational features provide significant predictive power in the opaque
counterpart. Though incorrectly, managers would be particularly concerned about making
the algorithms transparent when the marginal effect of the causal feature in separating the
H type agents from L type agents is small in the presence of correlational features in an
opaque algorithm. However, they should realize that the effect of the causal feature is sup-
pressed largely due to the strategic behavior of the agents when the algorithm is opaque.
All agents, but more importantly, H type agents, underinvest in the causal feature when
they know the correlational feature can separate them from L type agents: the higher the
predictive power of the correlational feature, the lower the incentive of the agents to invest
in the causal feature. When the algorithm is made transparent, in the new equilibrium, the
agents have a significantly higher incentive to invest in the causal feature, making the firm
better off.
To identify how much predictive power comes from each feature in a machine learning
model is not a trivial task. However, recent research on algorithm explainability and inter-
pretability (Arrieta et al., 2020) has started to provide approaches that can help identify
what features are important in a machine learning model. Managers should use these ap-
proaches to identify what causal and correlational features matter in their machine learning
model.
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The third factor managers should consider is the market composition in terms of the
fraction of H type agents. If managers find that the causal feature is unable to separate H
type agents from L type agents, they may still be better off with algorithmic transparency
if the cost of improving the causal feature is moderate and the market is composed of more
H type agents.
Overall, our results suggest that managers should not view manipulation by agents as bad.
Rather, they should embrace it and use algorithmic transparency as a lever for motivating
agents to invest in more desirable actions.
5.3 Implications for Public Policy
There are two key arguments typically put forth in support of algorithmic transparency.
First, making algorithms transparent could highlight any hidden biases in algorithms and
make them accountable (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2019, Cowgill and Tucker, 2020). Second,
the users who are affected by an algorithm’s decision making have the right to see which
factors affect decisions made about them. Our paper has implications related to this second
argument.
Recent legislation like the General Data Protection Regulation has afforded individuals
a right to explanation under which firms have to provide an explanation regarding how a
decision has been made by their algorithms (Goodman and Flaxman, 2017). Our results show
that such a regulation may not improve consumer welfare. When agents know which features
in an algorithm affect important decisions about them, they can improve those features.
Consequently, algorithmic transparency is generally viewed as helping the agents at the cost
of the firm. However, our results show that the agents may not benefit from algorithmic
transparency as expected. When algorithms are opaque, they derive their accuracy from
both causal and correlational features. Therefore, H type agents do not need to invest in
the costly causal feature to separate themselves from L type agents. In the transparent
scenarios, in many cases, the agents have to invest in the costly causal feature to achieve
similar or even less separation with no change in their wage.
5.4 Future Research Directions
Firms have typically kept their algorithms opaque to protect them from gaming by agents.
In this study, we show that this strategy may not be the best, and the firm could be better
off by making its algorithm transparent in the presence of strategic users. However, there
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are two other reasons as to why firms may still not want to make their algorithm transparent
– interpretability (Kroll et al., 2017, Brauneis and Goodman, 2017) and privacy (Ford and
Price, 2016, Brauneis and Goodman, 2017). With access to big data and large computational
power, machine learning models have become complicated to the extent that they are ren-
dered uninterpretable. While recent research has made advances in developing interpretable
machine learning models (Arrieta et al., 2020), Bertsimas et al. (2019) show that model
interpretability comes at a cost of accuracy. As a result, when considering the issue of algo-
rithmic transparency, it may be interesting to consider the tradeoff between interpretability
and accuracy. Similarly, when a firm makes its algorithm transparent, this can lead to pri-
vacy concerns. Others may be able to infer information about agents when they are selected
by a transparent algorithm. In these cases, algorithmic transparency may impose a privacy
cost on agents. Future research can investigate algorithmic transparency in the presence of
privacy concerns. We believe these are interesting avenues for future research.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In the proof, we will proceed as follows: First, we will study each equilibrium outcome by
both identifying the region in the CH-CL space in which this equilibrium can be realized and
analyzing the corresponding payoffs for the firm and agents.
Opaque Case 1. We first look at the case where neither H type nor L agents improve on
education. In this case, γES = γ
B
S . The firm’s strategy is to use: PA = PB = PD = 1, PC = 0.
To guarantee that this is a Nash equilibrium, we need the following conditions to be hold:
CH ≥ (1− λ)R (H type agents will not deviate)
CL ≥ λR (L type agents will not deviate)
γEA ≥ γth0 (the firm will not deviate on PA)
γEC ≤ γth0 (the firm will not deviate on PC).
(The first two conditions say that H type and L type agents are better off (in terms of utility)
by not switching to improving on education, and the last two conditions say that the firm
is better off (in terms of total payoffs) by not switching its strategies on PA and PC .) The
first two conditions specify the regions in CH − CL space that can induce this equilibrium
(the graph below shows this region). The last two conditions are the direct consequences of
Assumption (2):
λθ
λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ) ≥
R
α
= γth0
(1− λ)θ
(1− λ)θ + λ(1− θ) ≤ θ ≤
R
α
= γth0.
Total payoffs to each side are given by:
ΠfirmO1 = λθα− (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R
ΠHO1 = θλR
ΠLO1 = (1− θ)(1− λ)R.
where we use ΠHO1 and ΠLO1 to denote the total payoff of H type and L type agents,
respectively. (In the remaining of the proof, we will use ΠHOi and ΠLOi to denote total
payoff of H type and L type agents under case i, respectively.)
Opaque Case 2. In this case, only H type agents improve on education and we have:
γEB = γ
E
D = 1 and γ
E
A = γ
E
C = 0. We find another equilibrium where the firm’s strategy is
PA = PC = 0, PB = PD = 1. The conditions on the parameters are:
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Figure 6: opaque case 1
CH ≤ R (H type agents will not deviate)
CL ≥ R (L type agents will not deviate)
γEB ≥ γth1, γED ≥ γth1 (the firm will not deviate on PB and PD)
γEA ≤ γth0, γEC ≤ γth0 (the firm will not deviate on PA and PC).
The first two conditions specify the regions (see the graph below) that can induce this
equilibrium. The last two constraints are trivially satisfied.
Total payoffs to each side:
ΠfirmO2 = θ(α + β)− θR
ΠHO2 = θ(R− CH)
ΠLO2 = 0.
Opaque Case 3. In the case, both H type and L type agents improve on education. The
values of γE’s are given below:
γEA = γ
E
C = 0
γEB =
λθ
λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ)
γED =
(1− λ)θ
(1− λ)θ + λ(1− θ) .
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Figure 7: opaque case 2
The firm’s strategy is to use PA = PC = PD = 0, PB = 1. To guarantee that this is a
Nash equilibrium, we need the following conditions to hold:
CH ≤ λR (H type agents will not deviate)
CL ≤ (1− λ)R (H type agents will not deviate)
γEB ≥ γth1 (the firm will not deviate on PB)
γED ≤ γth1 (the firm will not deviate on PD).
The first two conditions specify the regions (see graph below) that can induce this equi-
librium. The last two conditions are direct consequences of Equation 1 and 2.
Total payoffs to each side:
ΠfirmO3 = λθ(α + β) + (1− λ)(1− θ)β − (λθ + (1− λ)(1− θ))R
ΠHO3 = θλR− θCH
ΠLO3 = (1− θ)(1− λ)R− (1− θ)CL.
Opaque Case 4. In this case, H type agents improve on education with probability pH
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Figure 8: opaque case 3
and L type agents do not improve on education. The values of γE’s are given below:
γEA =
θ(1− pH)λ
θ(1− pH)λ+ (1− θ)(1− λ)
γEC =
θ(1− pH)(1− λ)
θ(1− pH)(1− λ) + (1− θ)λ
γEB = γ
E
D = 1.
The firm’s strategy is to use PA = p4, PC = 0, PB = PD = 1. To guarantee that this is a
Nash equilibrium, the following conditions should hold:
CH = (1− λp4)R (H type agents are indifferent)
CL ≥ (1− (1− λ)p4)R (L type agents will not deviate)
γEA = γth0 (the firm is indifferent on PA)
γEC ≤ γth0 (the firm will not deviate on PC).
The last condition is satisfied following Assumption 2:
γEC =
θ(1− pH)(1− λ)
θ(1− pH)(1− λ) + (1− θ)λ ≤
(1− λ)θ
(1− λ)θ + λ(1− θ) ≤
R
α
= γth0.
The first condition could be used to represent p in terms of the other parameters and,
similarly, the third condition can be used to represent pH in terms of the other parameters.
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Specifically, we have:
p4 =
1
λ
(
1− CH
R
)
(A.1)
pH = 1− R(1− θ)(1− λ)
(α−R)θλ . (A.2)
Given the fact that p and pH are values between 0 and 1, we can calculate the range for
CH and CL that lead to this equilibrium (shown in the graph below):
(1− λ)R ≤ CH ≤ R
R− CH
R− CL ≤
λ
1− λ.
where the first inequality follows from the first condition and the second inequality follows
from the second condition.
Figure 9: opaque case 4
Total payoffs to each side:
ΠfirmO4 = θpH(α + β)− θpHR
ΠHO4 = θ(R− CH)
ΠLO4 = p4(1− θ)(1− λ)R.
Opaque Case 5. In this case, H type agents improve on education and L type agents
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improve on education with probability pL. We have:
γEA = γ
E
C = 0
γEB =
θλ
θλ+ (1− θ)pL(1− λ)
γED =
θ(1− λ)
θ(1− λ) + (1− θ)pLλ.
The firm’s strategy is to use PA = PC = 0, PB = 1, PD = p5. To guarantee that this is a
Nash equilibrium, the following conditions should hold:
CH ≤ (λ+ p5(1− λ))R (H type agents will not deviate)
CL = ((1− λ) + p5λ)R (L type agents are indifferent)
γEB ≥ γth1 (the firm will not deviate on PB)
γED = γth1 (the firm will not deviate on PD).
The second condition can be used to represent p in terms of the other parameters while
the last condition can be used to represent pL in terms of the other parameters. Specifically,
p5 =
CL −R
λR
+ 1 (A.3)
pL =
αθ(1− λ)− (R− β)θ(1− λ)
(1− θ)λ(R− β) . (A.4)
The third condition is satisfied following Equation 2 and 3:
γEB =
θλ
θλ+ (1− θ)pL(1− λ) ≥ γth0.
Given the fact that p and pL are values between 0 and 1, we can calculate the range for
CH and CL that lead to this equilibrium:
(1− λ)R ≤ CL ≤ R
R− CH
R− CL ≥
1− λ
λ
.
Total payoffs to each side:
ΠfirmO5 = θλ(α + β −R) + (1− θ)pL(1− λ)(β −R)
=
2λ− 1
λ
θ(α + β −R)
ΠHO5 = (θλ+ θ(1− λ)p5)R− θCH
ΠLO5 = 0.
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Figure 10: opaque case 5
Dealing with multiple equilibria. Per our analysis of the above five cases, there are
several regions where multiple equilibria exist. According to the dynamics of the game, in
the opaque case, agents move first and the firm moves next. Thus, the actual equilibrium
outcome would be the one gives agents the largest total utilities for each agents’ type. (In
theory, finding such an equilibrium is not always possible; fortunately, it is in our case.)
• In the region where Case 4 and Case 5 overlap, Case 4 always gives higher payoff to
both H type and L type agents:
ΠHO4 = θ(R− CH) > (θλ+ θ(1− λ)p5)R− θCH = ΠHO5
ΠLO4 = p4(1− θ)(1− λ)R > 0 = ΠLO5.
where the inequalities follow since p4 =
R−CH
λR
and p5 =
CL−R
λR
+ 1 are values between 0
and 1.
• In the region where Case 4 and Case 1 overlap, Case 1 always gives higher payoff to
both H type and L type agents:
ΠHO1 = θλR ≥ θ(R− CH) = ΠHO4
ΠLO1 = (1− θ)(1− λ)R ≥ p4(1− θ)(1− λ)R = ΠLO4.
where the inequalities follow since CH
R
≥ 1−λ in the overlapped region and p4 = R−CHλR
is between 0 and 1.
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• In the region where Case 1 and Case 2 overlap, Case 1 always gives higher payoff for
both H type and L type agents:
ΠHO1 = θλR ≥ θ(R− CH) = ΠHO2
ΠLO1 = (1− θ)(1− λ)R ≥ 0 = ΠLO2.
where the first inequality follows since CH
R
≥ 1− λ in the overlapped region.
• In the region where Case 1 and Case 5 overlap, Case 1 always gives higher payoff for
both H type and L type agents:
ΠHO1 ≥ ΠHO4 ≥ ΠHO5
ΠLO1 ≥ ΠLO4 ≥ ΠLO5.
where the first inequality follows since CH
R
≥ 1− λ in the overlapped region.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Similar to the proof of the opaque case, we proceed by analyzing the same five cases analyzed
in the opaque case. We show that only the equilibrium outcomes corresponding to cases 1
to 3 are sustainable.
Transparent Case 1. In this case, neither H type nor L type agents improve on education.
We have: γEE = θ and γ
E
F = 0. The firm’s strategy is to use PE = 0 and PF = 1. To
guarantee that this is a Nash equilibrium, the following conditions should hold:
CH ≥ R (H type agents will not deviate)
CL ≥ R (L type agents will not deviate)
γEE ≤ γth0 (the firm will not deviate deviate on PE).
The last condition follows from Equation 2:
γEE = θ <
R− β
α
<
R
α
= γth0.
The region described by the first two conditions on CH and CL is shown in Figure 11.
The payoffs to each side:
ΠfirmT 1 = 0
ΠHT 1 = 0
ΠLT 1 = 0.
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where we use ΠHT i and ΠLT i to denote total utilities of H type and L type agents under case
i, respectively.
Figure 11: transparent case 1
Transparent Case 2. In this case, only H type agents improve on education. We have:
γEE = 0 and γ
E
F = 1. The firm’s strategy is to use PE = 0 and PF = 1. The conditions
needed to guarantee that this is a Nash equilibrium are:
CH ≤ R (H type agents will not deviate)
CL ≥ R (L type agents will not deviate)
γEE ≤ γth0 (the firm will not deviate on PE)
γEF ≥ γth1 (the firm will not deviate on PF ).
The last two conditions are trivially satisfied (by Assumption 1, we have 0 < γth1 <
γth0 < 1.) The region described by the first two conditions above is shown in Figure 12. The
payoffs to each side:
ΠfirmT 2 = θ(α + β −R)
ΠHT 2 = θ(R− CH)
ΠLT 2 = 0.
Transparent Case 3. In this case, both H type and L type agents improve on education.
We have: γEE = 0 and γ
E
F = θ. The firm’s strategy is to use PE = 0 and PF = 1. The
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Figure 12: transparent case 2
conditions needed to guarantee that this is a Nash equilibrium are:
CH ≤ R (H type agents will not deviate)
CL ≤ R (L type agents will not deviate)
γEF ≥ γth1 (the firm will not deviate on PF ).
The third condition follows by Equation 3. The first two conditions specify the regions
in the CH − CL space as shown in Figure 13. The payoffs to each side:
ΠfirmT 3 = θ(α + β) + (1− θ)β −R
ΠHT 3 = θ(R− CH)
ΠLT 3 = (1− θ)(R− CL).
Transparent Case 4. In this case, H type agents improve on education with probability
pH and L type agents do not improve on education. We have:
γEE =
(1− pH)θ
(1− pH)θ + (1− θ)
γEF = 1.
The firm’s strategy is to use PE = p and PF = 1. The conditions needed to guarantee that
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Figure 13: transparent case 3
this is a Nash equilibrium are:
CH = (1− p)R (H type agents are indifferent)
CL ≥ (1− p)R (L type agents will not deviate)
γEE = γth0 (the firm is indifferent on PE).
Since pH is between 0 and 1, 0 < γ
E
E < θ. The last condition requires 0 <
R
α
< θ, or
equivalently α > R
θ
. In the range of α that we are considering (i.e., (θλ+(1−θ)(1−λ))R
θλ
< α < R
θ
,
by Assumption 2), this equilibrium cannot be sustained.
Transparent Case 5. In this case, H type agents improve on education and L type agents
improve on education with probability pL. We have:
γEE = 0
γEF =
θ
θ + (1− θ)pL .
The firm’s strategy is to use PE = 0 and PF = p. The conditions needed to guarantee
that this is a Nash equilibrium are:
CH ≤ pR (H type agents will not deviate)
CL = pR (L type agents are indifferent)
γEF = γth1 (the firm is indifferent on PF ).
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Note that, the second condition implies p = CL
R
. Given that p is between 0 and 1, any
value of CL between 0 and R is valid. As for the last condition, pL is between 0 and 1 implies
θ < γEF < 1. But, by Assumption 3, β > R − θα, which implies γth1 = R−βα < θ. Thus, the
last condition cannot be satisfied and, therefore, this equilibrium cannot be sustained.
A.3 Derivation of the lower and upper bound of α and β
In this paper we assume α to be in a certain range to eliminate uninteresting scenarios:
(θλ+ (1− θ)(1− λ))R
θλ
< α <
R
θ
.
In the opaque case, when there is no agent improves on the causal feature, we want the
firm to hire some agents based on the information in the correlational feature instead of
not hiring anyone. (not hiring anyone in this case is uninteresting because it will trivially
drive everyone improving on the causal feature). Thus we want α to be large enough to
incentivize the firm hiring agents who have value 1 on the correlational feature. In the
transparent case, when there is no agent improves on the causal feature, all the agents are
mixed together in the feature space: they all have the same values on both the causal and
correlational feature. The firm will either hire everyone or not hire anyone, depending one
whether the average productivity of all the agents exceeds the salary or not. We want α to be
small enough that the firm will not hire anyone in this case. (hiring everyone in this case is
uninteresting because no one will have incentive to improve on the causal feature regardless
of the cost of improving). Specifically, rewrite the left inequality as θλα+(1−θ)(1−λ)×0 >
(θλ + (1 − θ)(1 − λ))R. In the initial distribution of the opaque case, (i.e., where everyone
has a value of 0 on the causal feature), there are θλ H type agents and (1 − θ)(1 − λ) L
type agents who have value 0 on the causal feature and value 1 on the correlational feature.
The inequality means that their total productivity (left hand side) should be larger than the
total salary paid to them (right hand side). In other words, the firm has an incentive to hire
all of these agents. If this is not the case, then the firm will not hire anyone with value 0 on
the causal feature even if they have value 1 on the correlational feature which will trivially
incentivize individuals to improve on the causal features. The right inequality means in the
transparent case where the correlational feature is gamed, if everyone has value 0 on the
causal feature, the firm will not hire anyone.
In this paper we also assume β to be in a certain range to eliminate uninteresting sce-
narios:
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R− θα < β < R− θ(1− λ)α
θ(1− λ) + (1− θ)λ.
β is the marginal effect of education on the agent’s productivity.
Rewrite the left part in-equation as θ(α+β)+(1−θ)β > (θ+(1−θ))R. In the transparent
case where everyone games on the correlational feature and everyone improves on the causal
feature, there are θ H type agents and 1−θ L type agents who have value 1 on both feature.
The inequality means their total productivity (left hand side) is larger than the total salary
paid to them (right hand side). In other words, the firm will have incentive to hire all of
them. If this is not the case, then in transparent scenario no one will improve on the causal
feature and the firm will end up hiring no one. As for the right part in-equation, rewrite
it as θ(1 − λ)(α + β) + (1 − θ)λβ < (θ(1 − λ) + (1 − θ)λ)R. In the opaque case where no
one games on the correlational feature but everyone improves the causal feature, there are
θ(1− λ) H type agents and (1 − θ)λ L type agents who have value 1 on the causal feature
but value 0 on the causal feature. This in-equation means their total productivity (left hand
side) is smaller than the total wage paid to them (right hand side). in other words, the firm
will have no incentive to hire anyone of them. If this is not the case, then in the opaque case
improving on the causal feature will ensure an agent to be hired regardless of his value on
the correlational feature, which will again, lead to an uninteresting equilibrium.
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